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BRIEF OF CORPORATE LAW PROFESSORS
AS AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT
OF RESPONDENTS
The undersigned corporate law professors respectfully submit this brief as amici curiae in support of Respondents.1
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE
Amici have no personal stake in the outcome of
this case; their interest is in assisting the parties
and the Court in understanding corporate law and
the rights of shareholders, insofar as that law and
those rights are relevant to the questions presented
in this case. Joining in this brief as amici are the
following nineteen law professors, whose research
and teaching have focused on corporate law:
John C. Coates IV, John F. Cogan, Jr. Professor
of Law and Economics, Harvard Law School, and
Visiting Professor of Finance, Harvard Business
School
Lucian A. Bebchuk, William J. Friedman and Alicia Townsend Friedman Professor of Law, Economics, and Finance, and Director of the Program on
Corporate Governance, Harvard Law School
1 Pursuant to Rule 37.6, amici state that no counsel for a
party authored this brief in whole or in part, and no counsel or
party made a monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of this brief. No person other than amici
curiae or their counsel made a monetary contribution to the
preparation or submission of the brief. Pursuant to Rule
37.3(a), all appropriate parties have filed letters granting blanket consent to the filing of amici curiae briefs.

2
Bernard S. Black, Nicholas D. Chabraja Professor, Northwestern University Law School and Kellogg School of Management
John C. Coffee, Jr., Adolf A. Berle Professor of
Law and Director of the Center on Corporate Governance, Columbia Law School
James D. Cox, Brainerd Currie Professor of Law,
Duke University School of Law
Ronald J. Gilson, Marc and Eva Stern Professor
of Law and Business, Columbia Law School, and
Charles J. Meyers Professor of Law and Business,
Emeritus, Stanford Law School
Jeffrey N. Gordon, Richard Paul Richman Professor of Law and Co-Director, Richman Center for
Business, Law & Public Policy, Columbia Law
School
Lawrence Hamermesh, Ruby R. Vale Professor of
Corporate and Business Law, Widener University
Delaware Law School
Henry B. Hansmann, Oscar M. Ruebhausen Professor of Law, Yale Law School
Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Professor of Law and CoDirector, Ira M. Millstein Center, Columbia Law
School
Marcel Kahan, George T. Lowy Professor of Law,
New York University School of Law
Vikramaditya S. Khanna, William W. Cook Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School
Michael Klausner, Nancy and Charles Munger
Professor of Business and Professor of Law, Stanford
Law School

3
Reinier H. Kraakman, Ezra Ripley Thayer Professor of Law, Harvard Law School
Donald C. Langevoort, Thomas Aquinas Reynolds
Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center
Brian JM Quinn, Associate Dean for Experiential
Learning and Associate Professor of Law, Boston College Law School
Edward B. Rock, Saul A. Fox Distinguished Professor of Business Law, University of Pennsylvania
Law School
Mark J. Roe, David Berg Professor of Law,
Harvard Law School
Helen S. Scott, Professor of Law and Co-Director
of the Leadership Program on Law and Business,
New York University School of Law

4
INTRODUCTION AND
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court has often looked to the rights of corporate shareholders in determining the rights of union
members and non-members to control the union’s
use of their funds for political spending, and vice
versa. 2 In doing so, the Court has sometimes assumed that if shareholders disapprove of corporate
political expression, they can easily sell their shares
or exercise control over corporate spending. 3 This
assumption is mistaken. Because of how capital is
saved and invested in corporations, most individual
shareholders cannot obtain full information about
corporate speech or political activities, even after the
fact, nor can they prevent their savings from being
used to speak in ways with which they disagree.
E.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S.
310, 343-44 (2010); McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540
U.S. 93, 325 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring & dissenting),
overruled in part by 558 U.S. 310; Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 709-10 (1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting), overruled by 558 U.S. 310; Fed. Election Comm’n v.
Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 247 (1986); First
Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794 n.34 (1978); Pipefitters
Local Union No. 562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385, 401-02,
406-08 (1972); United States v. Int’l Union UAW-CIO, 352 U.S.
567, 585 (1957).
2

3 E.g., Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 370; McConnell, 540
U.S. at 275 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring); Austin, 494 U.S. at
709-10 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y.,
Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530, 555 (1980)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting); Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 794 n.34; see
also Int’l Assoc. of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Fed.
Election Comm’n, 678 F.2d 1092, 1117 (D.C. Cir. 1982).

5
Union non-members are currently protected from
being forced to fund union political expression or activity by opt-out rights under Abood v. Detroit Bd. of
Ed., 431 U.S. 209 (1977), and in this case plaintiffs
seek the more expansive right to refuse to fund any
union expression whatsoever. In contrast, individual
shareholders currently have no “opt out” rights or
practical ability to avoid subsidizing corporate political expression with which they disagree. Nor do individuals have the practical option to refrain from
putting any of their savings into equity investments,
as doing so would impose damaging economic penalties and ignore conventional financial guidance for
individual investors. If the Court decides to give union non-members additional rights to refuse to contribute to union speech, the Court should not act on
the erroneous belief that this will accord union nonmembers the same rights enjoyed by individual investors.
Giving union non-members additional
rights will only further increase the extent to which
they enjoy greater rights than corporate shareholders.
Part I shows that corporate law does not afford
shareholders any right to “opt out” or otherwise control the use of capital they have invested in a corporation. Part II shows that most corporate shareholders have no ability to use voting rights or sell
their shares to prevent their invested capital from
being used in ways with which they disagree. Part
III describes how investment structures, tax policy,
and conventional financial advice all drive individuals to invest in ways that reinforce their inability to
obtain information about or control corporate political spending.

6
ARGUMENT
I.

MOST INDIVIDUAL SHAREHOLDERS
HAVE NO RIGHT TO “OPT OUT” OR
OTHERWISE CONTROL THE USE OF
CAPITAL THEY INVEST IN A
CORPORATION.
What can a shareholder do if she disagrees with a
corporate expenditure, whether on a particular business strategy or in support of a political position?
The short answer is very little. Shareholders do not
typically have any right to control or direct the use of
capital they have invested in a corporation, whether
publicly or privately owned.
Authority over corporate funds resides in a board
of directors and officers to whom the board delegates
authority.4 Shareholders of U.S. corporations have
no authority to instruct or control boards, officers,
employees, or corporate agents in how they act for a
corporation, or to directly manage or act for a corporation.5 Instead, a “stockholder owns an interest in
a share of stock, a financial investment granting no
ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 105 (Little,
Brown & Co., 1986) (“directors . . . have the formal legal power
to manage the corporation”); Del. Code Ann. Title 8, § 141(a)
(West 2015). Delaware has been the leading corporate jurisdiction for decades, and this section is based primarily on Delaware law, but fairly summarizes the law in other states as well.
4

5 CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227,
232 (Del. 2008) (“it is well-established that stockholders of a
corporation . . . may not directly manage the business and affairs of the corporation”). In Europe, shareholders do have
rights to instruct directors. REINIER KRAAKMAN, ET AL., THE
ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW 73 (Oxford 2d ed. 2009).

7
direct control over the properties, equipment, contract rights, organizational structure, and other elements that make up the corporation itself.”6
Indeed, a core goal of corporate law is to give directors and officers legal authority to act in ways
with which shareholders may profoundly disagree.
Directors, officers, employees and corporate agents
are not agents of shareholders, and owe shareholders
no duty of obedience.7 This “separation of ownership
and control” is often identified as a fundamental or
essential attribute of the corporate form.8 “A review
of elementary corporate law shows that [the] power
of [a] principal to direct the activities of [an] agent
does not apply to the stockholders against the directors or officers of their corporation.”9
Directors and officers are fiduciaries for the corporation as a whole, and face judicial scrutiny in
shareholder-initiated lawsuits over whether they
6 Martin

Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, A New System of
Corporate Governance: The Quinquennial Election of Directors,
58 U. CHI. L. REV. 187, 193 (1991). For recent cases illustrating
this point, see, e.g., Gorman v. Salamone, 2015 WL 4719681, *5
(Del. Ch. July 31, 2015); CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 237.
7 Robert C. Clark, Agency Costs Versus Fiduciary Duties, in
PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 55, 5557 (John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser eds., Harvard
Business School Press 1985).

E.g., STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND
ECONOMICS 8-9 (Foundation Press, 2002); WILLIAM T. ALLEN ET
AL., COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 79 (Aspen Publishers, 4th ed. 2012).
8

9

Clark, supra note 7, at 56.
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have acted with care or engaged in self-dealing. 10
However, their duties do not compel directors to use
corporate funds to speak, or avoid speaking, in political controversies as they believe shareholders would
prefer, because the most basic of corporate law doctrines—the “business judgment rule”—precludes judicial review of board decisions, absent evidence of a
conflict of interest or a complete failure to exercise
any care.11
Expenditures by corporations on politics do not
typically generate heightened scrutiny, and shareholders cannot use derivative lawsuits to override

10

F.D.I.C. v. Wheat, 970 F.2d 124, 130 (5th Cir. 1992).

11 Kamin v. Am. Express Co., 54 A.D.2d 654 (N.Y. App. Div.
1976), aff’g 338 N.Y.S.2d 807 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976). The fact
that corporate speech furthers a director’s political views or
goals would not typically give rise to a “conflict of interest” for
corporate law purposes. Heightened judicial scrutiny generally
requires a showing of financial “self-dealing” where a fiduciary
“stands on both sides” of a transfer of assets to or from the corporation. Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 21-23 (Del. Ch. 2002)
(“in the absence of self-dealing, it is not enough to establish the
interest of a director by alleging that he received any benefit
not equally shared by the stockholders”); Sullivan v. Hammer,
1990 WL 114223, *5-*6 (Del. Ch. Aug. 7, 1990), aff’d 594 A.2d
48 (Del. 1991) (corporate “gifts” merely required to be “within
the range of reasonableness,” and board decision can be overturned on self-dealing grounds “only if a plaintiff can show that
a majority of the directors expected to derive personal financial
benefit from the transaction”); see also Theodora Holding Corp.
v. Henderson, 257 A.2d 398, 405 (Del. Ch. 1969); Sinclair Oil
Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 721-22 (Del. 1971); Case v. N.Y.
Cent. R.R. Co., 204 N.E.2d 643, 646-47 (N.Y. 1965); Shlensky v.
Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 779 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968).
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decisions about such expenditures by boards. 12
These facts about corporate law hold true even if (in
an unrealistic hypothetical) shareholders were uniform in their political views, and uniformly opposed
an expenditure approved by the corporate board.
These facts are unquestionably true in a more typical situation where shareholders disagree among
themselves about politics. Nor do shareholders have
indirect means to accomplish this goal—such as selling shares or using votes—as explained next.

12 Victor Brudney, Business Corporations and Stockholders’
Rights Under the First Amendment, 91 YALE L.J. 235, 257-58
(1981). The application of the deferential business judgment
rule to political expenditures is so clear that few cases have
even been pursued to a reported decision. A rare example, in
which the court held the business judgment rule was a valid
defense to an attack on a corporate contribution to a political
action committee, is Finley v. Superior Court, 96 Cal. Rptr. 2d
128 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000). An exception that proves the rule is
when political activity violates a statute, such as the statutory
ban on corporate donations to a political party. A legal violation removes judicial deference under the business judgment
rule. Miller v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 507 F.2d 759, 762 (3d Cir.
1974); cf. Barnes v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 20 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 87, 92-93 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (claim by policyholder of
mutual insurance company seeking to stop insurer from engaging in political activities dismissed because decision was protected by business judgment rule and policyholder had no constitutional right to prevent insurer’s use of premium revenues
to support activities with which premium holder disagreed, nor
to compel dividend to policyholders).
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II.

MOST INDIVIDUAL SHAREHOLDERS
CANNOT INDIRECTLY INFLUENCE
THE USE OF THEIR INVESTED CAPITAL FOR POLITICAL EXPRESSION.
The basic corporate law set out in Part I is sometimes viewed as incomplete because, it is asserted,
shareholders have indirect methods of achieving
what corporate law bars from them from achieving
through direct control. Shareholders, it is asserted
or assumed, can “opt out” by withdrawing their
funds if they do not approve of how directors are using their invested capital.13 Alternatively, they can
use their power to vote to elect directors who will act
as shareholders want.14
These assumptions are wrong for most shareholders. Controlling shareholders15 may be able to
control directors, but most shareholders beneficially
own stock as minority investors in corporations with
dispersed ownership. Most investors have little influence, direct or indirect, on a typical corporate
board. As stated by the Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court, “the practical realities of stock
market ownership have changed in ways that deprive most stockholders of both their right to voice
13 E.g., Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 794 n.34 (1978) (a “shareholder
invests in a corporation of his own volition and is free to withdraw his investment at any time and for any reason.”).

E.g., id. at 794–95 (emphasizing shareholders’ “power to
elect the board of directors” as a way “to protect their own interests.”).
14

15 “Controlling shareholder” means a shareholder with sufficient shares to determine the outcome of director elections.
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and their right of exit.”16 Both the right to sell and
the right to vote are typically useless for shareholders as a means of controlling or influencing specific
corporate actions, including the use of corporate
funds for political purposes.
A.

Shareholders do not typically have
the right to compel a corporation
to repurchase or find a buyer for
their shares.
Shareholders may not withdraw any of the funds
they have invested in a corporation except insofar as
a majority of the board approves a dividend or stock
repurchase.17 Shareholders who wish to sell shares
can only do so by finding third party buyers on their
own. But finding a buyer is typically difficult if not
impossible at the majority of corporations, as discussed next.

Leo E. Strine, Jr. & Nicholas Walter, Conservative Collision Course?: The Tension Between Conservative Corporate Law
Theory and Citizens United, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 335, 370
(2015).
16

17 See Del. Code Ann. Title 8, § 151(b) (West 2015) (every
Delaware corporation must have at least one class of nonredeemable common stock); Blaustein v. Lord Baltmore Capital
Corp., 84 A.3d 954, 958-59 (Del. 2014); Nixon v. Blackwell, 626
A.2d 1366, 1379-80 (Del. 1993).
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B.

Shares of most corporations are
not traded on public markets, and
finding buyers for such shares is
difficult or impossible.
As of 2012, more than five million corporations
filed U.S. income tax returns. 18 Only about 4,000
corporations were listed on a U.S. stock exchange—
less than 0.1% of corporations that filed tax returns. 19 Of the rest, some are owned by a single
shareholder, but many are beneficially owned by
dispersed minority owners. Most publicly traded
companies are bigger, on average, than companies
that lack active public markets for their shares. But
many companies without public markets are still
large and have substantial numbers of shareholders.
Examples include Cargill, with revenues exceeding
$130 billion and over 200 shareholders, and Mars,
with revenues exceeding $33 billion and over 45
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, 2012 STATISTICS OF INCOME,
CORPORATION INCOME TAX RETURNS 2 (2013), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/12coccr.pdf (Figure A).
18

19 Listed Domestic Companies, Total, THE WORLD BANK,
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.LDOM.NO (last
visited Oct. 27, 2015). More corporations are registered with
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), OFFICE OF
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
STUDY OF SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 SECTION 404 INTERNAL
CONTROL OVER FINANCIAL REPORTING REQUIREMENTS 21 (Sept.
2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2009/sox404_study.pdf, but many do so because they have publicly traded bonds and few shareholders, or lack significant amounts of
trading volume. John C. Coates IV, The Powerful and Pervasive Effects of Ownership on M&A (June 2010), at 5, available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1884157 (Table 1).
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shareholders.20 Large non-listed companies also include those controlled by private equity funds, which
represent dispersed investors through a variety of
intermediaries.21 In total, the value of unlisted corporations represents one-third to one-half of the value of all U.S. corporations.22
Listed shares trade in significant volume—
thousands of shares per day. By contrast, shares of
the vast majority of corporations do not trade in pub20 Andrea Murphy, America’s Largest Private Companies
2014, FORBES (Nov. 5, 2014), available at http://www.forbes.
com/sites/andreamurphy/2014/11/05/americas-largest-privatecompanies-2014/. See Petro Lisowsky & Michael Minnis, Which
Private Firms Follow GAAP and Why? (Sept. 11, 2015), at 39,
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2373498 (Table 2) (about
17,000 private firms report having more than 100 shareholders); Christian Leuz et al., Why Do Firms Go Dark? Causes and
Economic Consequences of Voluntary SEC Deregistrations, 45 J.
ACCOUNT. ECON. 181, 181 (2008) (hundreds of corporations
cease to be SEC-registered but continue to have numerous
shareholders).

Private equity funds own about 10% of all corporate equity, controlling more than 12,000 U.S. companies. Coates, supra note 19, at 7 (Table 2); PE by the Numbers, Quick Facts,
PRIVATE EQUITY GROWTH CAPITAL COUNCIL, http://www.pegcc.
org/education/pe-by-the-numbers/ (last updated Aug. 2015).
21

22 John C. Coates IV, Thirty Years of Evolution in the Roles
of Institutional Investors in Corporate Governance, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON SHAREHOLDER POWER 79, 89 (Jennifer G.
Hill & Randall S. Thomas eds., Edward Elgar 2015) (Table 4.1).
SEC rules require registration by companies with more than
500 unaccredited record shareholders (or more than 2000 accredited investors) and $10 million or more in assets. 15
U.S.C.A. §§ 78l, 78m, 78o(d) (West 2015). Public company
shareholders are also unable to use sales or votes to influence
political spending, for reasons discussed below.
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lic markets at all. When they do trade, they do so
only erratically.23 Finding a buyer for shares that
are not traded on public markets is difficult, and
sometimes impossible, at least at any reasonable
price.
Shares of unlisted corporations trade at heavily
discounted prices relative to their intrinsic value because of their lack of liquidity. 24 One study found
that, controlling for observable differences unrelated
to liquidity, stocks increased in price by 25% when
first listed on the New York Stock Exchange.25 Similarly, a study showed that prices for companies
without publicly traded stock can be 30% lower than
for comparable publicly held companies.26 A minority equity position does not have ability to control the
Leuz et al., supra note 20, at 184, 204-05 (reporting on
private companies with stocks that are traded but only at low
levels, with trading not occurring on many days). Private equity funds do not trade stocks, except as part of a sale of an entire
corporation, as chosen by fund advisors, not fund investors.
23

24 Reasons for this include: Few buyers have information
about such companies or sellers. Few sellers have information
about potential buyers, or even who they may be. Few dealers
hold such shares in inventory, and few brokers are available to
look for buyers. Few if any research analysts cover such companies. Transaction costs will be significant relative to the
sale. Such shares are held longer, tax bases are lower, and
sales trigger higher taxes. Fraud risk is higher, as such companies are not subject to disclosure laws or SEC enforcement.

Gary C. Sanger & John J. McConnell, Stock Exchange
Listings, Firm Value, and Security Market Efficiency: The Impact of NASDAQ, 21 J. FIN. QUANT. ANAL. 1, 14, 16 (1986).
25

26 John Koeplin et al., The Private Company Discount, 12 J.
APPL. CORP. FIN. 94, 95 (2000).
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decisions of the company, resulting in a further decrease in value known as a “minority discount.” 27
Even if shareholders are willing to accept such discounts, sales of stock of private companies take significant time and trigger taxes, reducing the attractiveness of “exit” in response to corporate actions the
shareholder disfavors.
In sum, the majority of individual owners of
shares of the majority of corporations would incur
significant economic costs to sell their shares.
C.

Stock sales cannot generally be
used to prevent, deter, or influence
the political activities of publicly
traded companies.
Even for shareholders of publicly listed companies, the ability to sell is generally not an effective
remedy for undesirable corporate political expenditures. Disclosure laws are currently such that
shareholders do not receive information that would
enable sales in advance of, or even in response to,
political expenditures. From the perspective of the
shareholder, a sale in response to an unwanted political expenditure would come too late, would be at a
price where the expenditure was already “priced in,”
and would entail relatively large costs (including
taxes). As such, individual share sales would at best
be the equivalent of closing the barn door after a
horse has been stolen, the stock being sold at a price
that already reflects the conduct to which the share27 John C. Coates IV, “Fair Value” as an Avoidable Rule of
Corporate Law: Minority Discounts in Conflict Transactions,
147 U. PA. L. REV. 1251, 1262-63 (1999).
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holder objected.
Federal law does not require corporations to provide shareholders with advance notice of political
expenditures. 28 In fact, most public companies do
not disclose anything about political expenditures,
even after the fact, except for contributions to connected political action committees that are required
to be disclosed under lobbying disclosure laws. Efforts to petition the SEC to adopt disclosure requirements for public companies29 have to date been
unavailing, and lobbying regulations are underenforced and far from comprehensive.30 While an increasing number of the very largest companies have
voluntarily adopted disclosure policies, few make
comprehensive disclosures—they do not, for example, report their contributions to trade groups that
lobby on their behalf. 31 Almost none makes these

28 Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Corporate
Political Speech: Who Decides?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 83, 89 (2010).

See COMMITTEE ON DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE POLITICAL
SPENDING, PETITION FOR RULEMAKING (Aug. 3, 2011), available
at http://sec.gov/rules/petitions/2011/petn4-637.pdf.
29

30 Charles Fried et al., Lobbying Law in the Spotlight:
Challenges and Proposed Improvements, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 419,
434-36, 462-63 (2011).

See ZICKLIN CENTER FOR BUSINESS ETHICS RESEARCH AT
WHARTON SCHOOL OF THE UNIV. OF PENNSYLVANIA, THE
2015 CPA-ZICKLIN INDEX OF CORPORATE POLITICAL DISCLOSURE
AND ACCOUNTABILITY 14-15 (Center for Political Accountability
2015), available at http://tinyurl.com/out9bfj. Shareholders can
seek information about political spending based on their rights
to inspect corporate “books and records,” e.g., Del. Code Ann.
Title 8, § 220, but to be effective such requests typically require
31

THE
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disclosures in advance.32
A prominent set of undisclosed corporate expenditures are dues and other contributions to trade
groups or organizations organized under Internal
Revenue Code sections 501(c)(4) and 501(c)(6). 33
Those organizations can spend up to half of their
revenues on politics without being treated as “political” by the Internal Revenue Service and without
disclosing specific donors, and they may be able to
spend more, to the extent tax law is underenforced.
Occasional leaks or accidental disclosures reveal
that many public corporations give substantial sums
to these organizations. 34 Outside such accidental
disclosures, shareholders ordinarily never learn
about these expenditures even after the fact, much
less in advance.
Shareholders thus have no means to respond to
corporate political spending to which they object.
Shareholders often never find out their money is being used to fund political expression or activity to
threatened or actual litigation and resources beyond those
available to most shareholders.
32

ZICKLIN, supra note 31, at 14-15.

For data on spending by such organizations, see Bebchuk
& Jackson, supra note 28, at 94.
33

34 E.g., Jonathan Weisman, G.O.P. Error Reveals Donors
and the Price of Access, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2014, at A15,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/25/us/republicans
-corporate-donors-governors.html?_r=0 (article detailing inadvertent disclosures of members of 501(c)(4), including CocaCola, Exxon Mobil, Pfizer, and Walmart, each of which contributed at least $250,000).
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which they would object, and even when they do find
out, any sale of shares will be too late to allow them
to “opt out” of that spending. By the time the sale
occurs, the political speech has already have been
made in the name of the corporation with the shareholders’ money. Without comprehensive disclosure,
even the deterrent effect of after-the-fact sales has
little force.
In addition, given that “market professionals
generally consider most publicly announced material
statements about companies, thereby affecting stock
market prices,”35 any expenditure will have already
had whatever effect on share value it is likely to
have by the time a shareholder learns about it, and
any sale by the shareholder will be at a price reflecting that effect. Sales of shares would also generate
transaction costs and trigger taxes. As a result, they
would only occur if a shareholder were willing to incur material economic losses to protest the use of the
shareholder’s invested capital.
From the perspective of a corporate board, if
shareholders sold shares en masse to protest the
same political expenditure, and buyers of the stock
shared the same negative view of the expenditure,
the company’s stock price could fall, increasing its
cost of capital. However, shareholders have no way
to coordinate among themselves in choosing whether
or when to sell. They are also unlikely to respond
uniformly or rapidly to the limited information
35 Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S.Ct.
2398, 2403 (2014) (quoting Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224,
248, n.28 (1988)).
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available about political expenditures, in part because they (and potential buyers of the stock) disagree about politics and the importance of any given
expenditure.
Even if shareholders could overcome their collective action problem, even if they had uniform views
about politics, and even if potential buyers of their
stock shared their views, companies raise relatively
little capital from equity investors after their initial
public offerings.36 They instead rely on earnings and
external debt to fund growth. 37 The prospect of
slightly higher equity capital costs due to sales by
shareholders would not deter most corporations from
political activity.
In sum, shareholders cannot control or deter political expenditures by selling their stock, or threatening to do so, even at public companies. This is
true even though many individual shareholders may
in fact disapprove of corporate political speech. The
majority of the beneficial owners of public companies
have no practical way to withdraw their capital to
prevent or control corporate political expenditures.
D.

Shareholder voting rights are not
generally useful for directing or
influencing specific corporate
actions.
The right to vote is no more useful than the right
to sell for shareholders who wish to control corporate
JONATHAN BERK & PETER DEMARZO, CORPORATE FINANCE
524-25 (Pearson, 3d ed. 2014).
36

37

Id.
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political expenditures. The reason is simple: Most
shareholders—and the majority of individual shareholders in public corporations—are not controlling
shareholders.38 That is, they do not have sufficient
voting rights to control their companies, nor do they
have the capacity to acquire control of the companies
in which they invest. Their voting rights give them
See note 15 above. A listed company will have in excess
of 500 shareholders on the company’s stock ledger (“record”
shareholders), and in fact public companies have on average
more than 12,000 record shareholders. Coates, supra note 19,
at 5 (Table 1). Some companies, such as Procter & Gamble,
have more than 2,000,000 shareholders. Id. at 5. By definition,
only one shareholder can be a “majority shareholder” for any
company. Even if several shareholders together control the
company, the number of shareholders in the control group will
usually be no more than a few.
38

An average public company thus has 12,000 minority
shareholders and only one majority shareholder or a few control shareholders. Even this understates the ratio of minority
to control shareholders, because (as discussed in Part III)
two-thirds of record shareholders are institutions, which invest
on behalf of thousands (or in aggregate, millions) of others.
Marshall E. Blume & Donald B. Keim, The Changing Nature of
Institutional Stock Investing (Nov. 12, 2014 working paper), at
2-3, available at http://tinyurl.com/qhqskrp; Coates, supra note
22, at 81. More than 95 million individuals own shares
through 3200 U.S. domestic equity mutual funds, for example.
Kimberly Burham et al., Ownership of Mutual Funds, Shareholder Sentiment, and Use of the Internet, 2013, ICI RES.
PERSP., Oct. 2013, at 1, available at https://www.ici.org/pdf/
per19-09.pdf; BRIAN REID ET AL., 2015 INVESTMENT COMPANY
FACT BOOK 177 (Investment Company Institute, 5th ed. 2015)
available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/2015_factbook.pdf (Table 5).
Thus, the true ratio of minority to control shareholders is vastly higher than 12,000 to 2 or 3 that the record shareholder data
suggest.
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no practical ability to influence management generally, much less to control or opt out of specific political expenditures.
The majority of corporations with dispersed ownership have one of two types of ownership structures,
neither of which creates practical opportunities for
voting rights to influence board decisions. At many
corporations, one person or small group has a control
“block” with effective ability to control the election of
directors, which renders the nominal voting rights of
minority investors incapable of changing the composition of the board. 39 Examples include Walmart,
Ford, Google, and Facebook. A recent study found
that 96% of a representative sample of U.S. companies listed on a stock exchange have a voting block
with 40% of the stock on average, and in many the
block controls a majority of shares.40 Since directors
are elected based on a plurality or majority of shares
voted, an effort by a minority shareholder seeking to
displace a director at these companies is either wholly futile (where a majority block will determine the
outcome), or would require convincing more than
95% of non-affiliated shareholders, a burden that is
insurmountable in practice.
In the second category, most public companies
that lack majority or near-majority blockholders are
large and have such dispersed ownership that few if
any shareholders are capable of overcoming the costs
of coordinating other shareholders to mount an effecClifford G. Holderness, The Myth of Diffuse Ownership in
the United States, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 1377, 1378-80 (2009).
39

40

Id. at 1382.
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tive election contest. 41 To elect directors at public
companies, shareholders must solicit “proxies,”
which requires significant legal and communication
costs. Incumbent directors, by contrast, can rely on
corporate funds to pay their costs of fighting the contest. A proxy contest typically lasts months42 and is
“extraordinarily expensive” for shareholders, 43 who
commonly incur more than ten million dollars in expenses 44 and are still outspent by incumbents. 45
Even when pursued by well-resourced activist hedge
funds, proxy contests are often unsuccessful. 46 To
give their proxy fights a boost, hedge funds build
blocks of stock that are substantially larger than
most individuals own or could afford—yet even
hedge funds generally avoid full-blown proxy contests. 47 While activist hedge funds have been in41

KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 29, 62.

42 Nickolay Gantchev, The Costs of Shareholder Activism:
Evidence from a Sequential Decision Model, 107 J. FIN. ECON.
610, 621 (2013) (Table 4).

Jana Master Fund, Ltd. v. CNET Networks, Inc., 954
A.2d 335, 341 (Del. Ch. 2008) (citing RANDALL S. THOMAS &
CATHERINE T. DIXON, ARANOW & EISHORN ON PROXY CONTESTS
FOR CORPORATE CONTROL § 21.01 (3d ed. 2001 supp.)).
43

44Gantchev,

supra note 42, at 610.

Mark A. Stach, An Overview of Legal and Tactical Considerations in Proxy Contests: The Primary Means of Effecting
Fundamental Corporate Change in the 1990s, 13 Geo. Mason U.
L. Rev. 745, 776 (1991).
45

46

Gantchev, supra note 42, at 620.

Id. at 618 (Gantchev assembles a comprehensive data set
of proxy contests between 2000 and 2007 and identifies only 74
that qualify—less than 0.1% of all elections of corporate direc47
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creasing in influence and activity levels over time,
their resources well exceed those of most individuals.
Institutions that invest on behalf of most individuals—such as mutual funds and pension funds—
rarely wage proxy contests.
In sum, whether because of insider blocks, or because of the collective action costs of proxy contests,
most shareholders of U.S. public companies do not
have meaningful ability to use their votes to influence boards of directors about anything, much less
specific political expenditures.
III.

MANY INDIVIDUALS ARE
EFFECTIVELY COMPELLED TO
MAINTAIN INVESTMENTS IN
COMPANIES WHOSE POLITICAL
EXPENDITURES THEY DO NOT KNOW
AND CANNOT CONTROL.
The bottom line of Part II is that the majority of
individual shareholders cannot use their rights to
sell or vote to avoid subsidizing corporate political
speech or activity with which they disagree. Reinforcing these limits are three trends in the ownership of U.S. corporations over the last thirty years.
These trends are towards (1) more institutional ownership, (2) more “layers” of institutions between individual owners and corporations, and (3) a general
tors over that period). A more recent study finds a modest increase in 2008 and 2009, but then a fall-off in 2010, and in all
years proxy contests occur in only a tiny fraction of board elections. Vyacheslav Fos & Margarita Tsoutsoura, Shareholder
Democracy in Play: Career Consequences of Proxy Contests, 114
J. FIN. ECON. 316, 339 (2014) (Fig A1).
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weakening of the ability of individuals to take action—whether through sales, votes, lawsuits or otherwise—to respond to corporate activities.
A partial cause of these trends is the nowstandard financial advice for individuals to invest in
diversified, low-cost, broad-based baskets of stocks
and to “buy and hold” for the long term. Standard
employer-sponsored retirement savings plans—a
channel through which an increasing share of investment flows—make it difficult or impossible for
individuals to do otherwise. Institutional intermediaries are not generally required to pass along to individual investors information they may receive as
record (i.e., formal) shareholders about specific decisions by corporations they own. Together, these
forces effectively cause an increasing number of individuals to maintain investments in corporations,
even if the individuals disagree with political speech
by corporations using their investment capital.
A.

Most beneficial owners of public
corporations are individuals who
own through institutions such as
mutual funds and pension funds.
Since the mid-20th century, institutions—pension
funds, insurance companies, bank trusts, mutual
funds, and other intermediaries—have held increasing amounts of stock issued by American corporations. Figure 1 reflects the Federal Reserve’s “Flow
of Funds” data, a standard source of information
about this trend.48 The Fed’s data make clear the
BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM,
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED STATES: FLOW OF FUNDS,
48

25
general magnitude and persistence of the trend toward institutional ownership.
Figure 1: Institutional Ownership
of U.S. Corporate Equity

The increase in institutional ownership began as
early as the 1950s, and has continued steadily ever
since. While ownership by the types of “institutions”
tracked by the Fed leveled off after 2000, other institutions, such as hedge funds and private equity
funds, have continued to increase their ownership.
The result is that less than one-third of total equity
BALANCE SHEETS, AND INTEGRATED MACROECONOMIC ACCOUNTS
118 (2015), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/
z1/current/z1.pdf (Table L.213). These data are not comprehensive, and understate institutional ownership because they
count private equity funds, non-profits, and hedge funds in the
“household” sector. Coates, supra note 22, at 89.
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in U.S. companies is now held directly by individuals.
The number of institutional layers between any
given corporation and the individuals who indirectly
own its stock (the “beneficial owners”) has also
grown. Institutions own about 10% of stock held by
equity mutual funds, and a larger share of other mutual funds—an increasing trend of individuals owning shares of institutions, which in turn invest in
other institutions, which in turn own corporate
stock.49
Mutual funds are a good example. Corporate law
only allows formal “record” owners that have held
shares continuously or on a certain date to exercise
shareholder rights.50 Mutual fund shares are commonly owned in “omnibus accounts” in which a broker pools shares on behalf of multiple clients in “subaccounts,” commonly including pension funds or insurers, some of which invest on behalf of multiple
beneficiaries. 51
This pooling and commingling

REID ET AL., supra note 38, at 217 (funds of funds), 234
(institutional investors other than funds of funds) (Tables 45,
62).
49

50 In re Appraisal of Dell Inc., 2015 WL 4313206, *3 (Del.
Ch. July 13, 2015) (granting motion for summary judgment,
holding institutional investors did not have appraisal rights
because administrative transfers among the layers of ownership violated what the court acknowledged was technical and
antiquated system focusing on continuous formal record ownership).

OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS AND EXAMINATIONS,
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, NATIONAL EXAM RISK
51
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means that individuals who invest their savings in
mutual funds—or who were forced to put their
workplace retirement savings into mutual funds—
are not the formal owners of “record” of any of the
companies their savings are supporting.
B.

Individuals who own stock through
intermediaries do not have the
right to direct the sale or votes of
their shares.
Most corporate stock held by institutions are held
by separate legal entities, such as mutual funds,
pension funds, insurance companies, hedge funds,
and private equity funds. Such entities do not pass
through to their own beneficial owners either the
rights to vote or sell the shares of the stock they purchase. Pension fund beneficiaries, for example, have
no ability to influence the companies in which the
funds are invested. 52 Insureds have no ability to
control how insurance companies invest the premiums they pay. Investors in mutual funds or exchange-traded funds do have the ability to select
funds based on stated investment policies, just as
annuitants generally have the ability to set basic investment parameters for how their funds are invested; once their funds are invested, however, the annuitants and fund investors have no ability to force the
divestment of a particular corporate stock, and may
only divest from the fund as a whole. Even the proALERT 1, 4 (Sept. 29, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/
about/offices/ocie/riskalert-mastersubaccounts.pdf.
Adam Winkler, Beyond Bellotti, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 133,
167 (1998).
52
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fessional managers of the increasingly important
category of index funds cannot sell a given company’s stock, because they have precommitted to hold
an entire index.
Individuals who own any of these types of institutional investments cannot exercise voting rights associated with the shares. Instead, those rights are
exercised by the management of the institutions.
Individuals that invest through institutions face collective action problems that are just as large as (if
not larger than) those facing individuals who directly
invest in corporations. The result is that most individuals, who now primarily invest through separate
entity intermediaries, cannot even exercise the limited powers analyzed in Part II.
To make these points concrete, consider an individual who buys the stock of a large broad-based
stock fund, such as Vanguard’s S&P 500 index fund.
That individual’s savings are invested in the stocks
of companies listed on the S&P index. Currently,
that fund owns shares of Apple, Inc. If, hypothetically, Apple’s board or its government affairs officer
were to spend money on political speech disfavored
by the individual, the individual has no power to
compel Vanguard to sell Apple stock in response.
Nor can the individual compel Vanguard to vote
against Apple’s current directors. All the individual
can do is to sell the Vanguard fund shares. But if
the individual wants to invest in a broad-based
large-cap fund of any kind, which would be advisable
for reasons discussed next, that individual would only be selling Vanguard shares to buy another fund’s
shares, which in turn would be likely to own Apple
stock. In short, unless an individual decides to ig-

29
nore standard financial advice about how to invest,
there is no way to avoid an investment in Apple,
however disagreeable its political activities may be.
C.

Individual investors have little
prudent choice other than
investing through institutions to
achieve diversification.
Part of the reason for the growth in institutional
investors is that finance theory and conventional financial advice long ago identified the fact that most
individuals are not well situated to select specific
stocks from thousands of equity investments. 53
Standard financial theory also has long identified
diversification as an important tool for investors to
achieve the best risk-adjusted returns.54
Diversification entails identifying and maintaining a substantial number of investments, not just
one or a few, and monitoring the companies selected
over time. For example, when two companies merge,
when one company goes bankrupt, or when a company divests a major business, investors must “rebalance” their portfolios to maintain a desired degree
of diversification and risk. Dividends must be reinvested, brokers retained, tax records kept, and filings made. Maintaining a diversified portfolio reFor an empirical study documenting the disadvantages
individual direct investors face, see Brad M. Barber & Terrance
Odean, Trading Is Hazardous to Your Wealth: The Common
Stock Investment Performance of Individual Investors, 55 J.
FIN. 773 (2000).
53

54 Harry M. Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FIN. 77, 79
(1952).
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quires effort, expertise, and time.
Professional asset management has also increasingly been most cost-effective for individual investors
through passive, indexed investment strategies. 55
Such strategies involve buying and holding broadbased index funds or financial products that mimic
such funds, which can achieve hard-to-beat returns
at low cost over sustained periods of time. Most
nominally “active” mutual funds rely to a large extent on passive investment in baskets of stock, and
simply “overweight” or “underweight” portions of the
relevant market benchmark. 56 Pension funds, too,
outsource portfolio management to advisers that invest in large numbers of public companies, rather
than a select few.
A further force leading individuals to invest
through institutions is the growing use of defined
contribution (DC) retirement plans such as 401(k)
and 403(b) plans. 57 Investment through DC plans
Burton G. Malkiel, Returns from Investing in Equity Mutual Funds 1971 to 1991, 50 J. FIN. 549, 571 (1995); RICHARD A.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 596 (Aspen Publishers,
8th ed. 2011).
55

56 K.J. Martijn Cremers & Antti Petajisto, How Active Is
Your Fund Manager? A New Measure That Predicts Performance, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 3329, 3330 (2009).

“Defined contribution” plans do not promise specific benefits, but instead allocate specific amounts as elected by an employee from their wages (sometimes matched by the employer)
into an investment account to be held for the employee’s benefit, typically until retirement. In contrast, more conventional
pension plans are called “defined benefit” plans because they
promise beneficiaries a specific set of benefits in retirement,
57
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enjoys strong tax benefits58—or, equivalently, investors pay economic penalties to invest outside a plan.
As a result, “[v]irtually all saving by the working-age
population currently takes place within employersponsored pension plans.” 59 An annual survey of
employer-sponsored plans found that 78% of eligible
employees participate, and fully diversified plan options are the default and most common investment
choice.60 Less than 10% of DC plans gave employees
the option to directly manage their investments in
individual stocks, and even those impose additional
fees on investors.61
While employees are given choices within DC
plans, these plans are designed by employers with
little input from typical employees. Most plans impose significant limits on the flexibility of employeeinvestors to choose from the universe of potential inand the risk of investment shortfalls is borne by the plan sponsor.
Retirement Savings Contributions Credit (Saver’s Credit),
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, https://www.irs.gov/RetirementPlans/Plan-Participant,-Employee/Retirement-SavingsContributions-Savers-Credit (last updated Oct. 23, 2015) (“The
amount of the [tax] credit is 50%, 20% or 10% of your retirement plan or IRA contributions up to $2,000 ($4,000 if married
filing jointly), depending on your adjusted gross income . . . .”).
58

59 Alicia H. Munnell et al., What’s the Tax Advantage of
401(k)s?, CENTER FOR RETIREMENT RESEARCH AT BOSTON COLLEGE, Feb. 2012, at 6, available at http://tinyurl.com/ndjkdwh.

AON HEWITT, 2014 UNIVERSE BENCHMARKS HIGHLIGHTS 1,
4 (2014), available at http://tinyurl.com/n964gmq.
60

61 Ian Ayres & Quinn Curtis, Beyond Diversification, 124
YALE L.J. 1476, 1485 & n.28, 1539 (2015).
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vestments, and commonly direct investments into
the kind of diversified index or other broad-based
funds that standard finance theory and advice recommends for individuals.62 An individual might get
to select between an international index fund and an
S&P 500 fund, but would rarely get to select between
investing in Apple and Walmart.
“The most common type of investment options in
401(k) plans are mutual funds or similar investment
vehicles that pool funds managed by a professional
fund manager.”63 Early withdrawals from these accounts are tax penalized64 and discouraged by plan
design.65 Similar tax subsidies and restrictions apAnne Tucker, Flawed Assumptions: A Corporate Law
Analysis of Free Speech and Corporate Personhood in Citizens
United, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 497, 539 (2010); see also Anne
Tucker, Retirement Revolution: Unmitigated Risks in the Defined Contribution Society, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 153, 181-82 (2013);
BRIGHTSCOPE & INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, THE
BRIGHTSCOPE / ICI DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PLAN PROFILE: A
CLOSE LOOK AT 401(K) PLANS 7, 15-17, 25 (2014), available at
http://www.ici.org/pdf/ppr_14_dcplan_profile_401k.pdf
(documenting number of investment options, portion in types of asset classes, growth in indexed equity funds within DC plans,
and that about 80% of plan assets are invested in diversified
institutions).
62

63 Ayres & Curtis, supra note 61, at 1485, citing Sarah
Holden et al., 401(k) Plan Asset Allocation, Account Balances,
and Loan Activity in 2012, 19 ICI RES. PERSP. Dec. 2013 at 1,
21.
64

I.R.C. § 401(k) (West 2015).

65 Phil Edwards et al., Defined Contribution Plan Success
Factors, DCIIA, May 2015, at 4, available at http://tinyurl.com/
edwards-dciia.
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ply to 529 plans, which have been increasingly used
by individuals to save for college education for their
children.66 To benefit from the tax subsidies fueling
the growth in DC plans, individuals must give up the
right to choose or influence the corporations in which
they invest.
As a result of these trends in financial management, it is difficult for most individual investors to
find any means of investing in corporate stock that
does not rely on both institutional intermediaries
and a broad-based, index or quasi-index strategy for
investing. The bottom line is that most individuals
now invest in a large number of public companies,
but do so indirectly, and generally cannot pick and
choose stocks based on the recent or expected specific
behavior of corporate issuers.
D.

Institutional intermediaries are
not generally required to track or
disclose to their beneficiaries the
political activities of the companies
in which they invest.
Another effect of increased institutional ownership of corporate stock, and of increased “layers” of
institutions, is to decrease further the amount of information that a typical individual shareholder can
obtain about the political activities of the companies
See An Introduction to 529 Plans, SECURITIES AND EXCOMMISSION,
http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/
intro529.htm (last modified Jan. 6, 2014) (“participants in college savings plans have limited investment options and are not
permitted to switch freely among available investment options.”).
66
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in which the individual invests. As discussed above,
most corporations do not provide detailed information about political expenditures. What limited
information they do provide to shareholders is given
to shareholders of record, which are increasingly institutional investors.
Institutions, in turn, report the values of their
investments, but they are not required to gather,
analyze and pass on information about the activities
of the companies in their portfolio. Institutions such
as mutual funds do not typically report to their investors even basic financial information about companies in which they invest, such as earnings, much
less operational information such as political expenditures. Nor do institutions typically devote any
effort to monitor political activities of the companies
in which they invest. Thus, even if individuals
wanted to pressure the companies they indirectly
own to alter political expenditures, they would lack
even the most basic rights to obtain information to
know where to focus their pressure.
E.

Most individual investors are in
practice compelled to maintain
investments in companies that can
engage in political expenditures
with which the investors disagree.
Together, the forces described in this Part III effectively compel an increasing number of individuals
to maintain investments in large numbers of corporations, even if the individuals disagree with political expressions or activities taken by those corporations.
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Individuals of course can choose not to invest in
stock at all, or choose not to invest in stock through
retirement plans. But avoiding all equity investment imposes a massive economic penalty over
time.67 Using conventional figures for expected returns on diversified equity investments and contrasting them with investments in Treasury bonds,
Figure 2 depicts how large the economic penalty of
staying out of stocks altogether grows over the
course of a typical investor’s life.68
The results are dramatic. An investor in stocks
can expect to have more than eight times as much
money after 35 years as an investor making the
same investment in government bonds. If one were
to assume that further investments were made each
year, as is customary for ordinary savers, the gap
would widen further. There simply is no economic
“option” for ordinary individuals saving for retirement to choose to avoid stocks altogether.

Benjamin I. Sachs, Unions, Corporations, and Political
Opt-Out Rights After Citizens United, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 800,
838-40 (2012).
67

68 The figure uses data from Aswath Damodaran, Data,
DAMODARAN ONLINE, http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/
New_Home_Page/data.html (last updated Jan. 5, 2015). It assumes a fixed one-time investment of $1000 by an investor at
age 30, and compounds returns annually on a diversified portfolio of equity investments using an expected rate of return
composed of the Treasury bond rate of 2.22% and an implied
equity risk premium of 6.28%, derived from trailing twelvemonth cash yield on investments in the S&P 500. It compares
the return on that investment with the return on investment
on Treasury bonds over the same period.
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Figure 2: The Cost of Opting Out of Stock

The same general point applies to the decision to
opt out of the tax advantages of broadly diversified
DC plans. Figure 3 depicts how large the economic
penalty of electing to invest directly in stocks and
not through tax-advantaged DC plans can be. 69
While not as severe as the cost of avoiding equity altogether, the cost of trying to avoid the constraints of
401(k) plans by investing directly in taxable accounts is still a draconian penalty, roughly equal to a
third of the expected return on a standard equity in69 This figure uses conventional figures for expected equity
returns and averages after-tax returns for taxable and taxdeferred accounts over the past twenty-five years, based on data and analysis from Munnell et al., supra note 59, at 5 (Table
4). It assumes a 6% expected pre-tax return, divided into 2%
dividends and 4% capital gains.
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vestment. And this figure understates the penalty,
because it excludes the “match” commonly given by
employers for investments through DC plans, and
only compares one investment at age 30, rather than
a more realistic stream of investments over time.
Figure 3: The Cost of Opting Out of
Tax-Advantaged 401(k)
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CONCLUSION
In sum, shareholders generally have no control
over corporate political spending. Under existing securities law and SEC regulations, shareholders lack
basic disclosure about corporate political expenses.
Even if they wanted to act on the limited information available, long-standing and basic corporate
law prevents shareholders from overriding or influencing board decisions about political spending. Nor
can shareholders use their rights to sell or vote to do
indirectly what they cannot do directly. Exit rights
are absent in a majority of U.S. corporations, and
would come too late to be effective as a response to
spending that shareholders disfavor.
Long-standing trends towards institutional, indexed, and constrained ownership further limits the
powers of individuals to control corporate political
spending. As Delaware’s Chief Justice noted, “most
of the stock of the wealthiest corporations in our society is not owned directly by human beings.”70 As a
result of basic corporate law, financial reality, and
tax policy, an increasingly large majority of Americans are effectively forced “to turn over their wealth
to institutions that are permitted to use it for expressive purposes that they do not support.”71
Union non-members are currently protected from
being forced to fund union political expression
against their will by their opt-out rights, and in this
case plaintiffs seek even broader rights to not fund
70

Strine & Walter, supra note 16, at 340.

71

Id. at 342.
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any union speech or activity whatsoever. The purpose of this brief was to show that, in contrast to the
protections afforded union non-members, individual
shareholders have no “opt out” rights, much less the
practical ability to choose not to subsidize corporate
political expression with which they disagree. If this
Court chooses to grant additional First Amendment
rights to union non-members, it will only further increase the extent to which they enjoy greater rights
than do corporate shareholders.
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